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Abstract. This paper represents the first step in an on-going work for designing 
an unsupervised method based on genetic algorithm for intrusion detection. Its 
main role in a broader system is to notify of an unusual traffic and in that way 
provide the possibility of detecting unknown attacks. Most of the machine-
learning techniques deployed for intrusion detection are supervised as these 
techniques are generally more accurate, but this implies the need of labeling the 
data for training and testing which is time-consuming and error-prone. Hence, 
our goal is to devise an anomaly detector which would be unsupervised, but at 
the same time robust and accurate. Genetic algorithms are robust and able to 
avoid getting stuck in local optima, unlike the rest of clustering techniques. The 
model is verified on KDD99 benchmark dataset, generating a solution 
competitive with the solutions of the state-of-the-art which demonstrates high 
possibilities of the proposed method.  
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1   Introduction 
Software applications (both commercial and research ones) that deploy a machine 
learning technique are considered to be among the emerging technologies that have 
demonstrated compelling value in enhancing security and other related data analysis. 
Machine learning-based applications use complex mathematical algorithms that scour 
vast amounts of data and categorize them in much the same fashion as a human 
would, or at least according to the categorization rules set by a human. Yet, they are 
able to examine far more data in less time and more comprehensively than a human 
can, highlighting those events that appear suspicious enough to warrant human or 
automated attention. 
Genetic Algorithms (GA) [1], in particular, offer certain advantages over other 
machine learning techniques, namely:  
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• GAs are intrinsically parallel, since they have multiple offspring, they can explore 
the solution space in multiple directions at once. If one path turns out to be a dead 
end, they can easily eliminate it and continue work on more promising avenues. 
• Due to the parallelism that allows them to implicitly evaluate many schemas at 
once, genetic algorithms are particularly well-suited to solving problems where the 
space of all potential solutions is truly huge - too vast to search exhaustively in any 
reasonable amount of time, as network data is.  
• Working with populations of candidate solutions rather than a single solution, and 
employing stochastic operators, to guide the search process permit GAs to cope 
well with attribute interactions and to avoid getting stuck in local maxima, which 
together make them very suitable for dealing with classifying rare classes, as 
intrusions are. 
• A system based on GA can easily be re-trained. This property provides the 
adaptability of a GA-based system, which is an imperative quality of an intrusion 
detection system bearing in mind the high rate of new attacks emerging.  
Our GA forms clusters of similar data and the principal idea is to allow the security 
expert to be the final arbiter of what is and is not an actual threat. In addition, after 
forming the initial clusters and assigning them the corresponding labels (also 
performed by the security expert), when classifying new events that do not correspond 
to any of the existing clusters, the network administrator is the one to decide whether 
the event corresponds to an existing cluster or whether a new cluster should be 
established. Our GA tool assists him by providing the level of proximity between the 
new event and the existing clusters. In this way, the system continuously updates 
itself, at the same time learning more about its environment. Thus, the main objective 
of this tool is to couple expert knowledge and GA data analysis technologies. An 
important point that should be emphasized is that our algorithm is unsupervised, i.e. it 
does not require training data to be labelled. In this way the extensive engineering and 
error-prone job of labelling network data is avoided.  
In the recent past, there has been a great deal of criticism towards applying 
machine learning techniques in network security. The critics refer mainly to two 
issues: 
1. Machine learning techniques do not exhibit broad applicability, i.e. they are not 
able to detect attacks for which they were not trained to detect 
2. Most of machine learning is focused on understanding the common cases, but 
what is wanted is to find the outliers (that are generally not so common) 
We have tried to mitigate these issues by coupling the GA with expert knowledge. 
In this way the GA process of learning is “revised” and moves towards the desired 
direction. This would not be possible without the intrinsic properties of GA, namely a 
high level of adaptability to the environment changes. Moreover, it is demonstrated 
that GAs cope well with classifying rare or uncommon cases. Finally, the algorithm 
is only one part within the broader intrusion detection [2] framework, while the critics 
mostly concern cases where a machine learning technique is deployed without any 
additional support. 
The rest of the work is organized as follows. Section 2 presents related work. 
Section 3 details the implementation of the system. Section 4 gives the results of 
initial testing, while Section 5 presents novelty and advantages of the approach, draws 
conclusions and suggests future strategies. 
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2   Related Work 
Most of the machine-learning techniques deployed for intrusion detection are 
supervised, as these techniques exhibit higher level of accuracy than the unsupervised 
ones. However, they have an important deficiency because they operate on labelled 
data. Labelling network data is time-consuming and error-prone process whose 
possible errors may affect negatively on the level of accuracy of deployed technique. 
On the other hand, unsupervised techniques as K-means clustering, although do not 
suffer from the problem of data labelling, exhibit other deficiencies. The number of 
clusters in K-means clustering has to be determined a priori and cannot be changed 
during the process. This is an important deficiency, as the optimal number of clusters 
in an environment that is constantly changing, as network environment is, is hard to 
determine. Moreover, this technique is known to get stuck at sub-optimal solutions 
depending on the choice of the initial cluster centres. kNN algorithm suffers from 
similar problem, that consists in determining the optimal value of k a priori without 
the possibility of changing it on the fly. Again, this does not provide the level of 
flexibility that is necessary in dynamic environments. Furthermore, its accuracy can 
be severely degraded by the presence of noisy or irrelevant features, meaning that it is 
not robust enough. 
On the other hand, GAs avoid getting stuck in local optima due to working with 
populations of candidate solutions rather than a single solution, and employing 
stochastic operators. For the same reason, they are very robust which helps them in 
dealing with noisy network data. Furthermore, our design does not assume that the 
number of clusters has to be known a priori which provides higher level of flexibility. 
Thus, our approach offers true prospects for gaining higher performances when 
dealing with network data. 
3   System Implementation 
The process of producing security intelligence is comprised of the following five 
steps depicted in Fig.1 below: 
 
Fig. 1. Detection process flow 
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The algorithm whose software implementation is presented in the following uses 
the GAlib genetic algorithm package, written by Matthew Wall at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology [3].  
3.1   Designate Data 
The input to the algorithm is raw data. The data is further captured by the Wireshark 
Network Protocol Analyzer [4] which provides the capture data in .csv format as 
output. Captured data completely defines particular connection, as it contains 
information about source and destination IP address, ports and payload data.  
3.2   Data Pre-processing 
In this step, each attribute, i.e. each feature of the pre-determined model of network 
connections, gets its value based upon the raw data obtained in the previous step. 
Thus, the output of this step consists of multi-dimensional event vectors that represent 
the model of network traffic. In this way every network connection is represented as a 
vector. 
3.3   Model Training 
This is the process of forming clusters of similar data. It is assumed that the number 
of clusters is not known a priori. This provides a higher level of flexibility as an 
unknown attack does not necessarily have to be joined to an existing cluster, yet it can 
form a new cluster. Initial clusters are formed in the process of training by evolving a 
genetic algorithm.  The genetic algorithm type deployed is Incremental GA, i.e. it 
uses overlapping populations, but with very little overlap (only one or two individuals 
get replaced in each generation). The replacement scheme used is WORST, i.e. the 
worst-performing individuals are replaced with the new ones in each iteration [3]. 
The pseudocode of the training process is given in Fig.2 below. The process of 
training is constantly repeated at certain moments of time. Each time different dataset 
is used for training. 
Set the number of individuals, the number of generations, and the 
number of individuals to be changed in each generation, mutation and 
crossover rate values; 
Initialize the population; 
For each individual from the population 
 For each connection from the dataset 
 Calculate fitness function according to the formula; 
 Breed the population using mutation and crossover; 
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 Substitute the worst individuals with the new generated 
ones; 
 Repeat the previous steps for the specified number of 
generations; 
Fig. 2. Pseudocode of the Training Process 
A further explanation of each step follows:  
Individual Representation and Population Initialization. Genomes of the GA are 
two-dimensional matrices, where each row represents a cluster centre. GAlib provides 
resizable two-dimensional genomes making in this way the idea of unknown number 
of clusters feasible [3]. Each element of a cluster centre corresponds to a feature of 
the pre-determined model of network traffic. Thus, the size of a row is equal to the 
pre-determined number of network features that describe the network model 
deployed.  
At the beginning of the first execution of the training process, each element of each 
genome of the population is initialized to a random float number. The initial 
population of every next training process will be the output of the previous one. The 
size of the population and the number of generations are set by the user. 
Performance Measurement (Fitness Function). For each chromosome, the centres 
encoded in it are first extracted, and then a partition is obtained by assigning the 
points to a cluster corresponding to the closest centre. The distance between the points 
is computed as the Euclidian distance [5]: 
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where c represents the vector of cluster centre whose dimensions are 1xn, n is the 
number of predetermined features used to represent the model of network traffic, and 
x represents the current packet converted to an event vector mentioned above. If all 
the distances to the corresponding centres are greater than the predefined threshold, 
then a new centre is established. The cluster centres encoded in a chromosome are 
then replaced by the centroids of the corresponding clusters. The cluster centroid is 
the average vector of all the vectors that belong to a cluster. 
Given the above partition, and the number of clusters, the value of the cluster 
validity index is computed. The fitness of a chromosome is then defined as a function 
of the corresponding cluster validity index. The Davies-Bouldin (DB) index [6] is 
selected because of the following advantages over other measures: 
1. Stability of results: this index is less sensitive to the position of a small group of 
data set members (so called outliers) than other measures, such as for example, the 
Dunn’s index. 
2. In the case of more than 2 clusters and the need to rank them, some measures (for 
example the Silhouette index) behave unpredictably, whereas the expected 
behaviour of the Davies-Bouldin index in these cases is good. 
DB index is a function of the ratio of the sum of within-cluster scatter to between-
cluster separation. The scatter within the ith cluster is computed as: 
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where Ci and | Ci | represent the ith cluster number of the elements that belong to the 
ith cluster respectively. ||x-ci|| is the distance between the centre and an element from 
the same cluster. It is calculated as the Euclidean distance given in the previous 
formula. The distance dij between two clusters is considered to be the Euclidean 
distance between the corresponding cluster centres. Then, we compute: 
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The Davies-Bouldin DB index is then computed as: 
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where K is the number of different clusters. The objective is to minimize the DB 
index for achieving proper clustering. Therefore, the fitness of chromosome j is 
defined as (1/DBj), where DBj is the Davies-Bouldin index computed for this 
chromosome. The maximization of the fitness function will ensure minimization of 
the DB index. 
Selection. Standard roulette-wheel selection is deployed. The possibility of 
selecting an individual is directly proportional to its fitness value [1]. 
Crossover. Standard one-point crossover is deployed. The possibility of crossover 
can be set by the user [1]. 
Mutation. A swap-mutator is deployed to carry out the process of mutation. The 
possibility of mutation can be set by the user [1]. 
The deployed selection, mutation and crossover operator are built-in the GAlib 
package [3].  
3.4   Cluster Labelling and Decision Making 
After the process of establishing the initial clusters, the next step is to classify 
network events. Before performing the process of classification, the clusters are 
labelled by the security expert. According to his previous knowledge, security expert 
may label the clusters as intrusive, normal or previously unseen that need further 
investigation. We have opted for this approach as it is the most appropriate solution 
for a system that is to be employed in a real-world application. 
During the process of classification, the Euclidean distances between the event and 
the existing clusters are calculated. The event is assigned to belong to the closest 
cluster. However, if all the calculated distances surpass the predetermined threshold 
value (that determines the maximum possible distance between a network event and 
its corresponding cluster centre, meaning that the packet does not correspond to any 
of the existing clusters), the security expert is called upon to be the final arbiter. Our 
GA tool assists him by providing the level of proximity between the new packet and 
the existing clusters. The security expert renders the final decision as to whether the 
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event corresponds to an existing cluster or a new cluster should be established, 
meaning that the event has been unknown up to this moment. In this way, the system 
continuously updates itself, at the same time learning more about its environment. 
4   Initial Testing and Results 
Testing of the implemented algorithm was carried out on the benchmark KDD99 
dataset [7]. As KDD set has its own pre-defined features [7], the step of data-
preprocessing explained above is skipped. GA parameters of initial testing are the 
following ones: initial population contains 100 individuals, 50 generations are 
evolved during the process of evolution, with the probabilities of crossover and 
mutation operator 0.9 and 0.1 respectively. For the purpose of initial testing, the 
process of labeling is performed using the existing labels of the dataset: a cluster gets 
the label of the group (normal or one of four types of attacks) whose number of 
individuals that pertain to the group is higher than the rest. 
The KDD dataset has been found to have a number of drawbacks [8], [9]. Thus the 
testing results do not reflect the behaviour of the algorithm in a real-world 
environment. Moreover, current testing is not performed in a manner the system is 
going to be utilized, i.e. all the tests were carried out on the initial clusters without 
performing any re-clustering by a security expert. The process of cluster labeling is 
also performed in a different way. Testing results, however, reflect a high capability 
that the algorithm exhibits in distinguishing intrusive connections from the non-
intrusive ones. The overall detection rate of 91% with a false-positive rate of 0.5% 
ranks this system as one of the best-performing unsupervised methods in the current 
state-of-the-art. Due to the skewed distribution of different attack groups (number of 
DoS attacks highly surpasses the number of the rest), deployed labeling results in 
assigning DoS label to all of the attacks groups. Furthermore, this leads to not having 
alteration of the final result (expressed in the terms of detection and false-positive 
rate) while changing different parameters of the proposed algorithm, such as 
population size or possibilities of the operators, or different fitness functions (Dunn 
index [6] or I-index proposed in [10]). 
The observed drawback consists in assigning some of the attacks into the clusters 
that represent different attacks groups, or declare them as normal. The latter is often 
the case with U2R (User-to-root) and R2L (Remote-to-Local) types of attacks for the 
dataset. This occurs partially due to the known drawback of the dataset, i.e. the 
dataset is proven to possess connections with absolutely the same or very similar 
feature values, but with different labels [8]. However, all the drawbacks are expected 
to be mitigated through the influence of the security expert.  
5   Conclusions and Future Strategies 
The described GA design represents a novelty in the network security field. Most of 
the existing applications of GAs for intrusion detection assume supervised learning 
where the training dataset needs to be labelled. Our design of the algorithm is 
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unsupervised, so we have avoided the process of labelling the data which can be time-
consuming and error-prone. On the other hand, various clustering algorithms have 
been deployed for classifying network events, but none of them was based on genetic 
algorithms. Hence, the algorithm as deployed presents a novelty in the network 
security field. Moreover, our system can cooperate with a security expert providing in 
that way higher accuracy and adaptability to environmental changes. 
Initial testing reflects a high capability that the algorithm exhibits in distinguishing 
intrusive connections from the non-intrusive ones. In the near future, the algorithm 
will be tested in a real-world environment as a part of the final product of the 
Intrusion Detection Project [2]. 
Strategies for the continuation and the improvement of the work presented here are 
numerous and concern various aspects of the algorithm. The question of data pre-
processing still remains unresolved. A promising solution could be to deploy the idea 
presented in PAYL [11]. More flexibility could be given to the algorithm by 
providing different options for performance measurement, selection, crossover and 
mutation. Moreover, there is a great possibility of using different standard genetic 
operators for selection (rank, tournament, deterministic sampling) or crossover (two-
point, even-odd) and mutation (random flip) or even developing custom operators [3], 
[1]. 
 
Acknowledgements. This work has been partially funded by the Spanish Ministry of 
Education and Science under the project TEC2006-13067-C03-03 and by the 
European Commission under the FastMatch project FP6 IST 27095. 
References 
1. Goldberg D: Genetic Algorithms in Search, Optimization, and Machine Learning, Addison 
Wesley Longman, Inc. 1989  
2. www.fastmatch.org 
3. GAlib A C++ Library of Genetic Algorithm Components, http://lancet.mit.edu/ga/ 
4. www.wireshark.org, accessed during 2007 
5. Richard O. Duda, Peter E. Hart, David G .Stork: Pattern Classification, 2nd Edition, Wiley 
InterScience, October 2000 
6. Bolshakova N. and Azuaje F.: Cluster Validation Techniques for Genome Expression Data, 
Signal Processing, 83, 2003, pp. 825-833. 
7. KDD Cup 1999 data. http://kdd.ics.uci.edu/databases/kddcup99/kddcup99.html, October 
1999, accessed during 2006 and 2007 
8. Bouzida Y and Cuppens F, : Detecting Novel and Known Intrusions, IFIP/SEC 2006, 21st 
IFIP TC-11 International Information Security Conference Karlstad University, Karlstad, 
Sweden. May 2006. 
9. McHugh J, :Testing Intrusion Detection Systems: A Critique of the 1998 and 1999 DARPA 
Intrusion Detection System Evaluations as Performed by Lincoln Library, ACM 
Transactions on Information and System Security, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 262-294, November 
2000 
10. Bandyopadhyay, S. and Maulik, U.: Nonparametric genetic clustering: comparison of 
validity indices, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, Cybernetics, Part C, 2001 
11. Ke Wang and Salvatore J. Stolfo. : Anomalous Payload-based Network Intrusion Detection. 
RAID, Sept., 2004. 
